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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(h) because this is a paternity proceeding, 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Appellee restates the issues on appeal as follows: 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Because the child who is the subject of this proceeding was placed for adoption, 
did the district court correctly conclude that Mr. Donjuan lacked standing to seek a 
paternity adjudication because he did not strictly comply with all of the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3), including the requirement to file a sworn affidavit in 
this proceeding? 
Issues of standing are reviewed under a correctness standard. In re Adoption of 
I.K., 2009 UT 70, ^  7, 220 P.3d 464. A district court's interpretation of a statute is also 
reviewed for correctness. H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 2009 UT 10, % 19, 203 P.3d 943. 
ISSUE NO. 2 
Does the relation back provision of Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) enable Mr. Donjuan to 
belatedly comply with the Adoption Act's sworn affidavit requirement where the state has 
a compelling interest in speedily identifying those fathers who have strictly complied with 
the statute within a very short time after the child's birth, Rule 15 only applies to 
pleadings and not affidavits or the verification of a pleading, and Mr. Donjuan's amended 
petition was never signed by his counsel. 
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(3) If none of the defendants resides in this state, the action may be commenced and 
tried in any county designated by the plaintiff in the complaint. 
(4) If the defendant is about to depart from the state, the action may be tried in any 
county where any of the parties resides or service is had. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-308 
If the county in which the action is commenced is not the proper county for the trial, the 
action may nevertheless be tried in the county in which it is filed, unless the defendant, at 
the time the answer is filed or an appearance is made, files a written motion requesting 
the trial be moved to the proper county. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-110(3)(b) 
(3)(b) If the unmarried, biological father does not know the county in which the birth 
mother resides, he may initiate his action in any county, subject to a change in trial 
pursuant to 78B-3-307. 
Utah Code Ann. § 786-6-121(3) 
(3) Except as provided in Subsection 78B-6-122(1), and subject to Subsection (5), 
with regard to a child who is six months of age or less at the time the child is 
placed with adoptive parents, consent of an unmarried biological father is not 
required unless, prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or 
relinquishes the child for adoption, the unmarried biological father: 
(a) initiates proceedings in a district court of Utah to establish paternity under 
Title 78B, Chapter 15, Utah Uniform Parentage Act; 
(b) files with the court that is presiding over the paternity proceeding a sworn 
affidavit: 
(i) stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the 
child; 
(ii) setting forth his plans for care of the child; and 
(iii) agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of 
expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the 
child's birth; 
(c) consistent with Subsection (4), files notice of the commencement of 
paternity proceedings, described in Subsection (3)(a), with the state registrar 
of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in a confidential registry 
established by the department for that purpose; and 
On August 3, 2009, Ms. McDermott appeared before Judge Kate A. Toomey in the 
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake City, Utah, ana executed her consent to 
adoption. R. 21, 45-49. At that hearing, Ms. McDermott's counsel informed the court 
that a paternity action had been filed and that notice of that action had been filed with 
Utah Vital Records, but that the putative father had not filed a sworn affidavit in the 
paternity proceeding. R. 21. The child was placed for adoption with prospective 
adoptive parents, who later filed a motion to intervene in the paternity proceeding. 
R. 64-74. 
Counsel for the prospective adoptive parents served notice of adoption 
proceedings on Mr. Donjuan. In that notice, Mr. Donjuan was informed of his failure to 
timely file a sworn affidavit with the district court in the paternity proceeding. R. 21, 
51-53. 
On August 11, 2009, Mr. Donjuan filed his Amended Petition to Establish 
Paternity ("Amended Petition"). R. 9-14. Although the Amended Petition is verified by 
Mr. Donjuan, it is not signed by his counsel. Id. Ms. McDermott received the Summons 
and Amended Petition on August 29, 2009. R. 16. 
On September 18, 2009, Ms. McDermott filed her Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 
State a Claim or for Summary Judgment ("Motion to Dismiss"). R. 17-63. On 
October 8, 2009, Mr. Donjuan filed his Objection to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and 
also filed a Motion to Change Venue and Motion to Stay Decision on Respondent's 
Motion to Dismiss. R. 77-174, 175-196. The district court entered a Memorandum 
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Upon being informed of the notice of commencement of paternity proceedings, 
Ms. McDermott's counsel asked the court clerk what Mr. Donjuan had filed. R. 20. 
Counsel discovered that Mr. Donjuan had not filed a sworn affidavit or any document 
containing the sworn statements required by Utah Code Ann § 78B-6-121(3)(b). R. 20, 
40-42. Counsel informed Ms. McDermott that Mr. Donjuan had not filed a sworn 
affidavit and, therefore, he had not strictly complied with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
121(3)(b). R.20. 
On August 3, 2009, Ms. McDermott appeared before Judge Kate A. Toomey in the 
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake City, Utah, and executed her consent to 
adoption. R. 21, 45-49. Therein, Ms. McDermott represents that she is currently single, 
and was not married at the time of conception to the birth father of the child or any other 
man. R. 48, <| 17. At that hearing, Ms. McDermott's counsel informed the court that a 
paternity action had been filed and that notice of that action had been filed with Utah 
Vital Records, but that the putative father had not filed a sworn affidavit in the paternity 
proceeding. R. 21. 
Counsel for the adoptive parents served notice of adoption proceedings on Mr. 
Donjuan. R. 21, 51-54. In that notice, Mr. Donjuan was informed of the failure to file 
the sworn affidavit with this Court. R. 52. 
On August 11, 2009, Mr. Donjuan filed the Amended Petition, apparently in an 
effort to correct his failure to timely file a sworn affidavit. R. 9-14. Although the 
Amended Petition is verified by Mr. Donjuan, it is not signed by his counsel. The 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Donjuan, the unwed putative father, did not strictly comply with all of the 
requirements of the Utah Adoption Act prior to his deadline for compliance. He does not 
dispute that, as of July 9, 2009, he knew of a "qualifying circumstance" as defined by 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(l)(a). Therefore, to preserve any rights to the child, he was 
required to fully and strictly comply with all of the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-6-121(3) by August 3, 2009, when Ms. McDermott, the birth mother, executed her 
consent to adoption. Because Mr. Donjuan did not file an affidavit with the district court 
by this date as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3)(b), he has waived any right to 
the child, including the right to maintain this paternity proceeding. 
Mr. Donjuan may not use Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) to rectify his failure to timely file a 
sworn affidavit. Rule 15(c) applies solely to pleadings and cannot be used to retroactively 
comply with an affidavit requirement by filing an amended verified petition. This is 
particularly the case in the time-sensitive context of an adoption proceeding, where a firm 
cutoff to a putative father's compliance period is essential. If a putative father were 
allowed to retroactively comply with the affidavit requirement through Rule 15(c), the 
state's compelling interests in preventing disrupted adoptions and promoting early and 
uninterrupted bonding between child and parents would be frustrated because no one 
would know with certainty if the putative father would eventually seek to comply with 
this requirement. Also, the birth mother would be forced to make the decision regarding 
whether to place her newborn child for adoption without the benefit of his sworn and 
9 
McDermott's consent to adoption, and therefore, he was not denied due process. The 
state also has a rational basis for requiring putative fathers to timely comply with the 
affidavit requirement. Mr. Donjuan's full faith and credit argument is without merit 
because the Georgia court never entered an order adjudicating paternity and actually 
denied his request to enjoin Ms. McDermott from leaving Georgia. Even if the Georgia 
court later adjudicated paternity, it would not alter the district court's determination that 
Mr. Donjuan forfeited his parental rights by not strictly complying with the Utah 
Adoption Act. 
11 
strictly complying with the Adoption Act. 2009 UT 46, If 1. Ultimately, the supreme 
court affirmed the district court's order dismissing the paternity proceeding because the 
unwed father lacked standing to assert any rights to the child. 2009 UT 46, ^ 1, 46. The 
court reiterated that unwed fathers must strictly comply with the statutory requirements 
before the mother executes her consent to the adoption. Id. *{ 28. 
Therefore, unless Mr. Donjuan timely and strictly complied with the requirements 
of the Utah Adoption Act, the district court correctly dismissed his paternity action. 
B. Because Mr. Donjuan knew of a "qualifying circumstance," he was 
required to have complied with all of the requirements of Section 
78B-6-121 prior to the birth mother's consent to adoption. 
An unwed father who has reason to know of a "qualifying circumstance," as 
defined by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(l)(a), prior to the birth mother's execution of 
her consent to adoption, waives any right to the child unless he strictly complies with the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121. Under Subsection 78B-6-122(l)(a), a 
"qualifying circumstance" exists if, prior to the birth mother's execution of her consent to 
adoption: 
(i) the child or the child's mother resided, on a permanent or temporary 
basis, in the state; 
(ii) the mother intended to give birth to the child in the state; 
(iii) the child was born in the state; or 
(iv) the mother intended to execute a consent to adoption or relinquishment 
of the child for adoption: 
(A) in the state; or 
(B) under the laws of the state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(l)(a). 
13 
(I) 20 days after the day that the unmarried biological father knew, or 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that a 
qualifying circumstance existed; or 
(II) the time that the mother executed a consent to adoption or 
relinquishment of the child for adoption. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(l)(c)(ii)(B). Consequently, where, as in this case, the 
unwed father learned of a "qualifying circumstance" more than 20 days prior to the day 
the birth mother signed her consent to adoption, he was required to have complied with 
the requirements of Section 78B-6-121 before she executed her consent. 
Mr. Donjuan was placed on inquiry notice of several "qualifying circumstances" 
prior to August 3, 2009, the date when Ms. McDermott's executed her consent to 
adoption. On July 9, 2009, Ms. McDermott's counsel informed Mr. Donjuan that she had 
relocated to Utah, planned to give birth in Utah, and planned to place the child for 
adoption in Utah and pursuant to Utah law. R. 34, 37. Thus, at that time, Mr. Donjuan 
knew of "qualifying circumstances" listed in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(l)(a)(i), (ii), 
and (iv). 
Notably, Mr. Donjuan did not argue before the district court or this Court that he 
did not learn of a "qualifying circumstance" on July 9, 2009. Therefore, it is undisputed 
that Mr. Donjuan had until Ms. McDermott signed her consent to adoption on August 3, 
2009, to comply with the requirements of Section 78B-6-121. 
C. Mr. Donjuan was required to have strictly complied with all of the 
requirements of Subsection 78B-6-121(3) prior to the adoptive 
placement, but did not comply with the sworn affidavit requirement of 
Subsection 78B-6-121(3)(b). 
15 
demonstrating his full commitment to his parental responsibilities prior to execution of 
the mother's consent to adoption. In In re adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 2008 UT App 449, 
199 P.3d 368, this Court recently held that an unwed father waived his rights to the child 
due to his failure to file a sworn affidavit with the necessary statements in his timely filed 
paternity action. As a result of the Utah Supreme Court's earlier decision in Thurnwaldv. 
A.E., 2007 UT 38, 163 P.3d 623, the parties agreed that the unwed father had "timely 
initiated proceedings to establish paternity and properly filed notice with the Department 
of Health." Baby Boy Doe, 2008 UT App 449,1 3, 199 P.3d 368. These actions gave the 
unwed father the right to notice of the adoption proceeding; however, it did not mean that 
he strictly complied with all the statutory requirements to preserve rights to the child. See 
Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38, ^  33, 163 P.3d 623. This Court agreed with the district court's 
decision that the unwed father had not strictly complied with the requirement to file a 
sworn affidavit under Subsection 78B-6-121(3)(b) and it affirmed the denial of his 
motion to intervene in the adoption. Baby Boy Doe, 2008 UT App 449, f^lj 4-6, 
199P.3d368. 
Similarly, Mr. Donjuan did not file a sworn affidavit prior to execution of the 
mother's consent to adoption. Ms. McDermott signed her consent to adoption on 
August 3, 2009, more than 20 days after Mr. Donjuan was informed of her plans to 
deliver the child in Utah and place the child for adoption pursuant to Utah law. R. 45-49. 
Mr. Donjuan filed his Petition on July 28, 2009. R. 3-6. However, the Petition was not 
17 
compliance is required by unwed fathers to prevent an adoption. See, e.g., Sanchez v. 
L.D.S Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984) ("It is of no constitutional 
importance that [the unwed father] came close to complying with the statute."); In re 
Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113,1121 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("[Requiring strict 
compliance with the adoption statutes is reasonable because of the nature of adoptions."). 
In other areas of law where strict compliance is required, Utah courts "have repeatedly 
denied recourse to parties that have even slightly diverged from the exactness required 
by" the statute. See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, If 12, 40 P.3d 632. 
Thus, because Mr. Donjuan did not file a sworn affidavit or any of the sworn 
statements required by Subsection 78B-6-121(3)(b) prior to execution of Ms. 
McDermott's consent to adoption, he did not strictly comply with this statute. And, Utah 
R. Civ. P. 15(c) does not excuse his failure to do so. 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) does not excuse Mr. Donjuan's failure to 
file a sworn affidavit prior to execution of Ms. McDermott's 
consent to adoption. 
Mr. Donjuan's reliance upon Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) to attempt to correct his failure 
to file a sworn affidavit is fundamentally misplaced. While the rule may be used to have 
the filing of an amended "pleading" relate back to the date the original pleading was filed, 
it cannot be used to have the filing of an affidavit or the verification of a pleading relate 
relationship with the child and "the child may be adopted without his consent unless he 
strictly complies with the provisions of this chapter . . . "); See also, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78B-6-120(l)(f)(2) and 78B-6-122(2). 
19 
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both during pregnancy 
and upon the child's birth . . . [and] the state has a compelling interest in 
requiring unmarried biological fathers to demonstrate commitment by 
providing appropriate medical care and financial support and by 
establishing legal paternity, in accordance with the requirements of this 
chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-102(5)(e, f) (emphasis added). This section also provides that 
an unwed father "has the primary responsibility to protect his rights," and his "failure to 
strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate" his rights, would cause that 
"his biological parental interest may be lost entirely, or greatly diminished in 
constitutional significance." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-102(6)(b, e). Finally, "[a] certain 
degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the state's compelling interest," and 
"the interests of the state, the mother, the child, and the adoptive parents . . . outweigh the 
interest of an unmarried biological father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to 
establish and demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with the 
requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-102(6)(c). 
The Utah Supreme Court long ago recognized the state's compelling interest in 
speedily identifying those with a legal interest in an adoption even before enactment of 
these provisions: 
The state has a strong interest in speedily identifying those persons who will 
assume the parental role over such children, not just to assure immediate 
and continued physical care but also to facilitate early and uninterrupted 
bonding of a child to its parents. The state must therefore have legal means 
to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether the biological parents 
(or either of them) are going to assert their constitutional rights and fulfill 
21 
assurance that the unwed father is legally bound to fulfill his parental obligations. If 
assurance is not obtained within one full business day after the child's birth, then the 
mother and the state have the right to substitute adoptive parents willing to assume these 
responsibilities for the child. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-102(5)(b) ("an unmarried 
mother, faced with the responsibilities of making crucial decisions regarding her future 
and the future of a newborn child, is entitled to privacy, and has the right to make timely 
and appropriate decisions regarding her future and the future of the child, and is entitled to 
assurance regarding the permanence of the adoptive placement"); Thurnwald, 2007 UT 38, 
134, 163P.3d623. 
Thus, this Court should not interpret Subsection 78B-6-121(3)(b) to allow an 
unwed father to fabricate compliance by verifying an amend paternity petition filed after 
the adoptive placement. 
3- Case law supports an interpretation of Subsection 78B-6-121(3) 
that does not allow compliance through the relation-back 
doctrine. 
No Utah case allows a party to satisfy a sworn affidavit requirement through the 
relation-back doctrine in any context, let alone in the time-sensitive context of adoption 
proceedings. Although the issue was raised in Baby Boy Doe, 2008 UT App 449, Tflj 3-5, 
199 P.3d 368, this Court did not determine the issue.5 The unwed father had filed a timely 
5
 In that case the district court actually rejected the unwed father's attempt to use 
Rule 15(c) to comply with Subsection 78B-6-121(3)(b). Counsel for appellees was also 
counsel for the adoptive parents in Baby Boy Doe. While certain facts are unfortunately 
23 
Moreover, in many respects Mr. Donjuan showed less initial compliance with the 
sworn affidavit requirement than did the unwed father in Baby Boy Doe. Whereas the 
father in Baby Boy Doe filed a timely verified petition, Mr. Donjuan's paternity petition 
was unverified. R. 3-6. Also, whereas the father in Baby Boy Doe filed an amended 
petition in the effort to supplement his original petition the next day, Mr. Donjuan's 
amended petition was not filed until a week after his time for compliance had expired. 
Indeed, Ms. McDermott, through counsel, checked to see if he had filed a sworn affidavit. 
R. 20. Discovering its absence, she and the adoptive parents relied upon this fact in 
proceeding with the execution of her consent to adoption. Id. Thus, the reliance upon Mr. 
Donjuan's insufficient paternity petition was much greater than what occurred in Baby Boy 
Doe. 
Furthermore, in the context of medical malpractice suits (which arguably require 
less finality that adoption cases), courts have repeatedly denied attempts to use Rule 15(c) 
to relate back to an original petition to correct a failure to file a sworn affidavit. See 
Scarsella v. Pollak, 607 N.W.2d 711,713 (Mich. 2000); Thigpen v. Ngo, 558 S.E.2d 162, 
166 (N.C. 2002); Fales v. Jacobs, 588 S.E.2d 294, 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). In each of 
these cases, the courts rejected a plaintiffs argument that amendment under Rule 15(c) 
was proper to correct the failure to file an affidavit or certification with the original 
complaint as required by these states' laws. Each court ruled that to do so would conflict 
with the legislature's direct intent and effectively repeal the affidavit requirement. 
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4. Where Mr. Donjuan's paternity petition was null and void upon 
expiration of his statutory deadline for compliance, his amended 
petition is meaningless. 
Where an unwed father is considered to have waived any rights to the child due to 
his failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection 78B-6-121(3), efforts to amend a 
paternity petition are futile because that petition becomes null and void once his time for 
compliance has expired. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(2) states that an unwed father "who 
does not fully and strictly comply with requirements of Section 78B-6-121 and this section 
is considered to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child[.]" 
(emphasis added). Failure to strictly comply renders his incomplete efforts to establish 
parental rights a nullity, because by failing to comply he has lost any right to the child. Use 
of the term "any" includes the right to maintain a paternity action, and use of the past tense 
"considered" is significant because it indicates he waived his rights at the point when his 
statutory deadline elapsed. 
The time limit imposed by Subsection 78B-6-121(3) is similar to the deadline 
imposed by the mechanics lien statute. In Diehl Lumber Transp. Inc. v. Mickelson, 
802 P.32d 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the court rejected a contractor's argument that 
application of the relation-back doctrine preserved his counterclaim for foreclosure against 
the property owner. It stated that, because the deadline for foreclosing a mechanics lien 
"forms a part of the right and must be pursued within the time prescribed . . . [i]f an action 
is not brought within the time limited, the court is without jurisdiction to decree a 
27 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO TRANSFER 
MR. DONJUAN'S PATERNITY PROCEEDING TO ANOTHER VENUE. 
Mr. Donjuan argues that the district court did not have proper venue of the paternity 
proceeding and erred by denying his motion to transfer venue to the Third District Court, 
where the adoption petition was pending. Appellant's Brief at 18-19. He is mistaken. 
Mr. Donjuan, as the petitioner (or plaintiff) in his paternity proceeding, was entitled 
to choose the forum in which his action was commenced. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-6-110(3)(b) provides that "[i]f the unmarried, biological father does not know the 
county in which the birth mother resides, he may initiate his action in any county, subject to 
a change in trial pursuant to Section 78B-3-307[.]" (Emphasis added). Mr. Donjuan claims 
that he did not know the county where Ms. McDermott resided when she delivered the 
child, so he elected to file his paternity action in the First District Court, in and for Box 
Elder County, where his counsel maintains their office. Although Mr. Donjuan could have 
chosen to file his petition in any county in Utah, he chose to file it in Box Elder County, 
which presumably was the most convenient forum for him to do so. 
Although Subsection 78B-6-110(3)(b) acknowledges that the district court may 
transfer venue subject to Section 78B-3-307, it does not provide an unwed father with any 
right to request transfer to a different venue. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-110(3)(b). Section 
78B-3-307 provides that an action should generally be tried in the either the county in 
which "the cause of action arises" or the county in which "any defendant resides at the 
commencement of the action." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-307. However, unless the 
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his appearance long before filing the motion to change venue.7 Furthermore, his motion 
comes after even the defendant, Ms. McDermott, has made her appearance and, thus, any 
right to move for a change of venue was waived at that time. Each party is allowed one 
chance at selecting venue: for a petitioner when his petition is filed, and for a respondent 
when she makes her first appearance in the case. 
Additionally, because Mr. Donjuan had his choice of the venue in which to file his 
paternity proceeding, he cannot credibly argue that such venue was inconvenient. He 
certainly was not prejudiced by the venue, particularly where the district court was able to 
resolve the case on briefing alone and without the need for an evidentiary hearing. 
III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT MR. DONJUAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
ARGUMENTS. 
A. Mr. Donjuan did not preserve his constitutional arguments. 
For the first time in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Donjuan raises two constitutional 
arguments. First, he argues that requiring strict compliance with the affidavit requirement 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3)(c) violates the due process clauses of the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Next, he argues that Subsection 78B-6-121(3) is 
unconstitutional because it negates giving full faith and credit to paternity actions initiated 
7
 This situation makes it clear why Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-308 specifically 
references a defendant, and not simply a party. A plaintiff cannot file a motion for 
change of venue before the complaint is filed, and since the motion must be filed before 
the answer or an appearance is entered, filing the complaint necessarily waives any option 
a plaintiff may possibly have had for asking for a change of venue. The plaintiff chooses 
where to file the complaint, and then the defendant chooses whether to move for change 
of venue or accept the plaintiffs choice of venue. 
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preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant's brief must include a "citation to the record 
showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). 
Mr. Donjuan did not raise his constitutional arguments in the district court. None of 
his briefing in the district court even references these issues, let alone specifically raises 
them with supporting legal authority as required. R. 3-16; 77-196. Moreover, because this 
case was resolved on the briefing, his counsel did not raise these arguments during any oral 
argument before the court. Mr. Donjuan certainly does not satisfy his burden of showing in 
the Appellant's Brief that the constitutional issues had been preserved. Indeed, he does not 
show that any of the arguments were preserved by citing to the record. Appellant's Brief 
at 3, 4. He also makes no effort to argue that this Court should consider arguments that had 
not been preserved before the district court. Id. Therefore, he may not raise his 
constitutional issues before this Court. 
B. Even if the Court were to reach the merits of Mr. Donjuan's 
constitutional arguments, Subsection 78B-6-121(3)(b) as applied does not 
violate due process. 
1. Because Mr. Donjuan had a meaningful opportunity to comply 
with the affidavit requirement prior to the birth mother's consent 
to adoption, he was not denied due process. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently defined the contours of an unmarried 
biological father's opportunity interest in a child and his due process rights if he grasps that 
opportunity interest. While Mr. Donjuan argues that the Utah Supreme Court has never 
decided whether the affidavit requirement of 78B-6-121(3) and its sub-parts passes 
constitutional muster, Appellant's Brief at 17, the court has definitely considered the 
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without due process of law where the putative father has not acquired a fundamental 
parental right by complying with the statutory requirements of the Utah Adoption Act. In 
re adoption ofT.B., 2010 UT 42, ffif 26-44, 656 Utah Adv. Rep. 68. In T.B., the putative 
father argued that, due to his interactions with the child and his payment of certain 
expenses relating to the child, he obtained fundamental parental rights, including the right 
to consent the adoption, that cannot be taken away by statute absent a compelling state 
interest. 2010 UT 42, «f 27, 656 Utah Adv. Rep. 68. However, the supreme court rejected 
his argument that he had acquired a constitutional right to consent to the adoption prior to 
the birth mother's relinquishment of the child for adoption. Id. f^ 29. 
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that "constitutionally protectable 
'[pjarental rights do not spring full-blown form the biological connection between parent 
and child[, but] . . . require relationships more enduring.'" 2010 UT 42, f^ 30, 656 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 68, quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257, 103 S. Ct. 2985, 77 L. Ed. 2d 
614 (1983). The court continued by defining the narrow contours of an unmarried 
biological father's due process rights: 
[W]hat the Due Process clause protects, as far as an unwed natural father is 
concerned, is the "opportunity" to develop a relationship, by taking a 
responsible role in the life of his child. So long as a state's adoption code 
contains procedures that provide a putative father a meaningful chance to 
preserve his opportunity to develop a relationship with his child, due process 
is satisfied. 
2010 UT 42, K 31, 656 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (emphasis in original). The court noted that 
"individual states may define when an unwed father has grasped that opportunity." 
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guarantees an unwed father the right to preserve his parental opportunity by 
following state procedures. If he fails to comply with the procedures 
available to protect his right to develop an enduring, committed relationship 
with his child, a putative father risks the possibility that the natural mother's 
relinquishment of the child may eliminate his opportunity to acquire 
constitutionally protectable parental rights before he has been able to obtain 
them. 
2010 UT 42, H 40, 656 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (emphasis added). 
Mr. Donjuan had a reasonable opportunity to comply with the requirements of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3) prior to his statutory deadline for doing so. He demonstrated 
this by filing a paternity petition and registering notice of it with Vital Records. He could 
have easily submitted the requisite sworn affidavit when he filed his paternity petition, but 
simply failed to do so. Therefore, like the putative father in T.B., he "has no valid 
constitutional objection to the operation of the statute." 2010 UT 42, f^ 32, 656 Adv. Rep. 
68. 
2. The state has a rational basis for requiring putative fathers to 
comply with the affidavit requirement prior to the adoptive 
placement. 
Mr. Donjuan argues that the sole purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121 is "to 
provide notice, prior to the consent of the mother, to the state [or] any party attempting to 
adopt a child that a father has filed a paternity action" and that "[t]he affidavit requirement 
serves no beneficial purpose." Appellant's Brief at 17. He is wrong. 
Although Mr. Donjuan identifies one purpose underlying Section 78B-6-121, it is 
not the sole purpose. The state has "a compelling interest in requiring unmarried biological 
fathers to demonstrate commitment... by establishing legal paternity, in accordance with 
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Adoption Act often have little comprehension or consideration of the enormously difficult 
decision that unmarried mothers face. Unfortunately, it is commonplace for unwed mothers 
to be lulled into deciding to parent the child by false promises of an unwed father, only to 
find out too late that they alone must shoulder the entire burden of raising and providing for 
the child. Those birth mothers who have the courage to place their children for adoption 
should not have to wonder whether the adoption may later be undone by a putative father 
who has not made the requisite commitments beforehand. If a man is unwilling to commit 
to the mother and her future children by marrying her prior to the child's conception, it is 
not unduly harsh to require him to file a sworn affidavit making certain binding legal 
commitments to the child prior to her placing the child for adoption. See Sanchez v. L.D.S. 
Social Serv., 680 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1984) ("It is not too harsh to require that those 
responsible for bringing children into the world outside the established institution of 
marriage should be required either to comply with those statutes that accord them the 
opportunity to assert their parental rights or to yield to the method established by society to 
raise children in a manner best suited to promote their welfare."). 
The affidavit requirement also actually protects certain unwed birth fathers and 
ferrets out those cases were the birth father truly does not want to be responsible for the 
child, but has been put up to filing a paternity action to obstruct the adoption by a paternal 
grandparent or someone else. It is not unusual in cases where an unwed birth father has 
filed a paternity action, that a paternal grandparent, and not the birth father, is actually the 
one opposed to the adoption. Thus, the affidavit requirement protects unsuspecting birth 
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pool of potential adoptive parents and possibly result in disrupted adoptions, contrary to the 
compelling interests of the state. See id. Tf 47; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-102(5)(c) 
("adoptive children have a right to permanence and stability in adoptive placement"). 
C. Even if the Court were to reach the merits of Mr. Donjuan's full faith 
and credit argument, the argument is without merit. 
1. The Georgia court never entered an order adjudicating paternity 
and actually denied Mr. Donjuan's request to restrain and enjoin 
Ms. McDermott from leaving Georgia. 
Even if the Mr. Donjuan had preserved his full faith and credit argument by raising 
it in the district court, the argument is without merit. The Superior Court of Forsyth 
County, Georgia ("Georgia court") has never issued an order adjudicating Mr. Donjuan to 
be the child's father. Indeed, the only order the Georgia court has entered is its Order on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, entered on July 20, 2009. Therein the Georgia court 
dismissed Mr. Donjuan's legitimation claim and stayed his paternity claim pending the 
child's birth. 
Importantly, the Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss specifically denied Mr. 
Donjuan's request "to restrain and enjoin [Ms. McDermott] from leaving the jurisdiction 
o f the Georgia court. R. 149. Mr. Donjuan's representations to the contrary are false and 
misleading. 
Mr. Donjuan points to language in the Georgia court's Standing Domestic Relations 
Order to argue that Ms. McDermott was precluded from coming to Utah to deliver the child 
and place her for adoption. Although the Standing Domestic Relations Order does contain 
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action in California prior to the child's birth); In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1122 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the district court was not required to wait until the 
Indiana court ruled on putative father's paternity claim before proceeding with the 
adoption). 
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court denied intervention and enforcement of a 
temporary custody order from another state because the order was issued after the birth 
mother relinquished her parental rights to the child. H. U.F. v. W.P. W., 2009 UT 10, 
203 P.3d 943. In H. U.F., the putative father argued that the district court should have given 
full faith and credit to a paternity order entered by an Arizona court after the adoptive 
placement. 2009 UT 10, If 39, 203 P.3d 943. Although the Utah Supreme Court agreed 
that the paternity order was entitled to full faith and credit, it held that the district court's 
failure to afford the paternity order full faith and credit was harmless error because the 
paternity order was untimely and therefore did not give the birth father grounds to contest 
the adoption. Id. The court explained as follows: 
First, the [district] court found that the order was a "nullity" because it was 
issued after the Birth Mother relinquished her rights to B.G.S., and, 
accordingly the Putative Father lost any right to consent the adoption. We 
agree. The paternity order was a "nullity" as it pertains to whether the 
Putative Father may contest the adoption of B.G.S. However, that 
determination does not mean that we decline to give the order full faith and 
credit. As our analysis indicates, the right to establish paternity is a separate 
and distinct right from the right to contest an adoption. The establishment of 
paternity is only one of many requirements that a putative father must satisfy 
before he establishes the right to contest an adoption. In this case, the 
Putative Father failed to meet the additional requirements, therefore, it is 
irrelevant whether he was able to establish paternity. 
43 
DATED this 28th day of June, 2010. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
UL 
irry S. Jenkins 
Lance D. Rich 
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of June, 2010, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed in the U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Jennifer D. Reyes 
Dale M. Dorius 
DORIUS & REYES 
P.O. Box 895 
29 South Main 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
1 
45 
ADDENDUM A 
A-1 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER. STATE OF UTAH 
T'IIII \m\imma0at^mmmmmmammmmmmammmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmtmmmmmmm 
MARCO A. DONJUAR 
Petitioner, 
v. 
GABRIELLE MCDERMOTT, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 094100254 
Judge: Ben H. Hadfield 
THE ABOVE MATTEP. is before the Court pursuant to Petitioner Marco Donjuaif s 
("Petitioner") Motion to Change Venue and Motion to Stay Decision on Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or for Summary Judgment ("Motion to Stay Decision "). In 
preparation of its decision, the Court has reviewed Petitioner's Motions and Memorandum in 
Support, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, each document submitted before the Court, and 
the applicable case lawr and statutory provisions. Having considered the foregoing, the Court 
issues this decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On July 28, 2009, Petitioner initially filed his paternity proceeding in the First District 
Court, Box Elder County. Petitioner asserts that he only filed in Box Elder County because he 
did not know where Respondent was residing in Utah, but has since learned that Respondent and 
the child at issue reside in Salt Lake County. Further, the child at issue in this paternity 
proceeding is also the subject of a pending adoption proceeding filed in the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County. Therefore, Petitioner has moved the Court for an order changing venue to the 
Third District Court in Salt Lake County, arguing that the venue is more appropriate and 
convenient, and has moved the Court to stay its decision on Respondent's pending motion. 
DISCUSSION 
In Utah, a motion for change of venue may not be made by a plaintiff U.C.A. § 
78B-3-30S. Plaintiff controls the initial choice of venue by choosing where to file the action, 
1 
NOV 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 0 94100254 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: LANCE D RICH 500 EAGLE GATE TOWER 60 E S TEMPLE SALT LAKE 
CITY, UT 84111 
BY HAND: DALE M DORIUS 
Dat lio<\ 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER. STATE OF UTAH 
MARCO A. DONJUAN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
GABRIELLE McDERMOTL I 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 094100254 
Judge: Ben H. Hadfield 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Respondent Gabrielle 
McDermott's ("Respondent") Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or for Summary 
Judgment. In preparation of its decision, the Court has reviewed Respondent's Motion and 
Memorandum in Support, Petitioner's Objection, each document submitted before the Court, and 
the applicable case law and statutory provisions. Having considered the foregoing, the Court 
issues this Memorandum Decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On July 31, 2009, in Salt Lake City, Utah, Respondent gave birth to a female child 
conceived during her non-marital relationship with Petitioner in the State of Georgia. On July 6, 
2009, Respondent, through a letter sent by her counseL informed Petitioner that she had relocated 
to Utah and that she intended to deliver the baby and place the child for adoption in Utah. 
Petitioner filed his initial Petition to Establish Paternity with this Court on July 28, 2009, and an 
amended verified petition on August 10, 2009. Respondent executed her consent to the child's 
adoption on August 3, 2009. Respondent now moves the Court to dismiss Petitioner's action or, 
in the alternative, for summary judgment. 
DISCUSSION 
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but 
challenges the plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. Hess v. Johnston, 163 P.3d 747, 750 
(Utah Ct. App. 2007). A motion to dismiss is appropriate only where it is clear that the plaintiff 
1 
DE 
In this case, it is undisputed that Petitioner failed to file a sworn affidavit, as required by 
Utah Code Ann. Subsection 78B-6-121(3)(b), before Respondent executed her consent to the 
adoption. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner did not strictly comply with the requirements 
of Section 78B-6-121. The Court also finds that Petitioner's subsequent filing of an amended 
verified petition is insufficient to cure his failure to strictly comply with the statute. Accordingly, 
the Court concludes, as a matter of law, that Petitioner has waived and surrendered any right in 
relation to the child, including standing to pursue this proceeding to establish paternity. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or for Summary 
Judgment is granted, and Petitioner's Petition to Establish Paternity is hereby dismissed. 
Dated A T ^ f ^ i ^ d a y of December, 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
Ben RTIadfield 
DISTRICT COURT JU 
A-3 
V'OODCRAPOur 
Larr, S. Jenkins (4854) 
Lance D. Rich (10241) 
BnmonM. Wilkms (10713) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 Last South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)366-6060 
Atiorneys for Respondent 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY 
MARCO A. DONJUAN, ) 
Petitioner. 
v. 
GABRIELLE McDERMOTT, 
Respondent. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO ST A TE 
A CLAIM OR FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 094100254 
) Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or for Summary 
Judgment came on for decision before the Court. Having reviewed the memoranda submitted by 
the parties and the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted. 
The facts are undisputed that Petitioner Marco Donjuan did not fully and strictly comply with all 
of the requirements for unmarried biological fathers who desire to preserve rights to children 
who are placed for adoption, which are found in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3). Mr. Donjuan 
did not file a sworn affidavit with this Court as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121 (3)(b) 
prior to the time Respondent executed her consent to the adoption of the child. As such, he is 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY thai on the | J _ day of December. 2009.. I caused to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM OR FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to the following: 
Dale M. Dorius 
Jennifer D. Reyes 
DORIUS & REYES 
P.O. Box 895 
29 South Main 
Brigham City. LIT 84302 
Attorneys fur Marco Donjuan 
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DALE M. DORIUS - #0903 
JENNIFER D. REYES - #9004 
DORIUS & REYES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
P. 0. Box 895 
29 South Main 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
(435) 723-5219 Phone 
(435) 723-5210 Fax 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARCO A. DONJUAN, ) 
PETITION TO ESTABLISH 
Petitioner, ) PATERNITY 
vs. ) 
GABRIELLE McDERMOTT, ) Civil No. C$4 ( 0 0 2£<-/ 
Respondent. ) Judge 
COMES NOW Petitioner, by and through his attorney Dale M. Dorius, and hereby petitions 
the Court and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. Petitioner and Respondent had a relationship and from said relationship a child was 
conceived out of wedlock. 
2. Respondent is expected to give birth to a child on or about July 31,2009. Petitioner 
and Respondent are both residents of Georgia, however the current location of 
Respondent is unknown. It has recently come to Petitioner's attention Respondent 
may give birth in Utah and does not desire to keep the child. 
Petition to Establish Paternity - Page ] 
cost. Each of the parties should be ordered to pay one-half of any uninsured medical 
costs incurred on said child. 
LIFE INSURANCE 
11. The parties should be ordered to maintain life insurance with said child as beneficiary 
thereunder, so long as it is available through their places of employment at a 
reasonable cost. Each party should be allowed to add any future children, bom or 
adopted, as beneficiaries thereunder. 
TAX DEDUCTION AND TAX CREDIT FOR THE MINOR CHILD 
12. Petitioner should be entitled to claim the parties' minor child as his dependant for 
federal and state income tax purposes each and every year. 
BENEFITS 
13. The minor child should be awarded all the rights and benefits of the Petitioner and 
Respondent including Social Security and other rights belonging to the minor child. 
RESTRAINING ORDERS 
14. Petitioner and Respondent should be restrained from disparaging or slandering each 
other in any manner, and should be restrained from allowing third parties to make 
disparaging or slanderous remarks about each other. The parties should be restrained 
from placing the minor child in the middle of the parties' dispute(s) with one another 
including, but not limited to, using the minor child as a messenger, or directing others 
to do the same. 
Petition to Establish Paternity - Page 3 
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DALE M. DORIUS - #0903 
JENNIFER D. REYES - #9004 
DORIUS & REYES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
P. O. Box 895 
29 South Main 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
(435) 723-5219 Phone 
(435) 723-5210 Fax 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARCO A. DONJUAN, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GABRIELLE McDERMOTT, 
Respondent. 
) 
AMENDED PETITION TO 
) ESTABLISH PATERNITY 
Civil No. 094100254 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
COMES NOW Petitioner, MARCO A. DONJUAN, being first duly sworn, and hereby 
petitions the Court and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. Petitioner is over the age of 18. is competent to testify, and the information contained 
herein is based on Petitioner's personal knowledge or upon information and belief 
2. Petitioner and Respondent had a relationship and from said relationship a child was 
conceived out of wedlock. Respondent is expected to give birth to a child on or about July 31.2009. 
Petitioner and Respondent are both residents of Georgia, however the current location of Respondent 
is unknown. It has recently come to Petitioner's attention Respondent may give birth in Utah and 
does not desire to keep the child. 
Amended Petition to Establish Paternity - Paee 1 
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child's paternal grandmother, would provide cliild care for the child when needed, however child care 
would be at a minimum due to Petitioner's ability to work from home. 
d. Petitioner has a stable and suitable home for the cliild. and the child will have 
its own room. 
PARENTING PLAN 
9. Parenting time, whether by agreement of the parties or by applying the minimum 
guidelines, should be in compliance with the following provisions: 
a. The minor child should reside in Petitioner's home and should have visitation 
with Respondent pursuant to Utah Code §30-3-35 
b. Petitioner and Respondent should mutually discuss the minor child's 
education, health care, and religious upbringing, however Petitioner as custodial parent should have 
the primal*}^  decision-making authority. 
c. Either parent may make emergency decisions affecting the health or safety of 
the child. 
d. The parties should make a good faith effort to resolve future conflicts or 
disputes through the dispute resolution process. 
e. If either part}7 decides to move 150 miles or more from the custodial parent's 
home at the time of the Decree and Order Establishing Paternity, the moving party should provide 
the other part}' with 30 days written notice. Either party, upon motion, may seek review of the 
parenting time arrangements, to include extended parenting time and costs; 
f. Special consideration should be given to each parent to make the child 
available to attend family functions, including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious 
Amended Petition to Establish Paternity - Page 3 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND PAYMENTS OF MEDICAL EXPENSES 
12. The parties should be ordered to maintain health and accident insurance on the minor 
child, so long as it is available through their places of employment at a reasonable cost. Each of the 
parties should be ordered to pay one-half of any uninsured medical costs incurred on said child. 
LIFE INSURANCE 
13. The parties should be ordered to maintain life insurance with said child as beneficiary 
thereunder, so long as it is available through their places of employment at a reasonable cost. Each 
party should be allowed to add any future children, born or adopted, as beneficiaries thereunder. 
TAX DEDUCTION AND TAX CREDIT FOR THE MINOR CHILD 
14. Petitioner should be entitled to claim the parties' minor child as his dependant for 
federal and state income tax purposes each and ever}7 year. 
BENEFITS 
15. The minor child should be awarded all the rights and benefits of the Petitioner and 
Respondent, including Social Security and other rights belonging to the minor child. 
RESTRAINING ORDERS 
16. Petitioner and Respondent should be restrained from disparaging or slandering each 
other in any manner, and should be restrained from allowing third parties to make disparaging or 
slanderous remarks about each other. The parties should be restrained from placing the minor child 
in the middle of the parties' dispute(s) with one another includmg. but not limited to, using the minor 
child as a messenger, or directing others to do the same. 
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FORSYTH COUNTY 
F
^ c o i m GEORGIA 
STATE O F GEORGIA RLTOIN7MBOFRCf 
JUL 2 0 2009 
MARCO DONJUAN, ) 
P l a i n t i f f ; 
* ™|£^|to| COURT 
) CIVIL ACTION 
v. ) FILE NO. 09CV-14 92 
GABRIELLE ELAINE McDERMOTT, 
Defendant . 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT7 S MOT I OK TO DISMISS 
Defendant having f i l e d n e r Mot ion r o Dismiss and M o t i o n f o r 
E x p e d i t e d Hear ing ; and t h e C o u r t h a v i n g found t h a t good c a u s e 
e x i s t s t o e x p e d i t e argument and h e a r i n g on D e f e n d a n t ' s M o t i o n t o 
D i s m i s s ; and t h e Court having e n t e r e d i t s Order s e t t i n g t h i s m a t t e r 
f o r an e x p e d i t e d h e a r i n g on J u l y 9, 2'0'0*9'-; 'and counseJ f o r b o t h 
p a r t i e s h a v i n g appeared and p r e s e n t e d argument o e f o r e t h e C o u r t ; 
and t h e Cour t having c o n s i d e r e d s u c h argument t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e 
p a r t i e s ' r e s p e c t i v e b r i e f s ; now, t h e r e f o r e ; t h e Cour t m a k e s t h e 
f o l l o w i n g F i n d i n g s of Fact and C o n c l u s i o n s of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 . 
The P l a i n t i f f f i l e d h i s P e t i t i o n t o L e g i t i m a t e and f o r C u s t o d y 
and C h i l d Suppor t on May 19, 2 0 0 9 , and P l a i n t i f f s e r v e d D e f e n d a n t 
t h e r e w i t h on May 21, 2009. 
Paae J oi I 
C-2 
IN TIIE SWERIOR COURT OF FORSYTH COU , r ^ Y T H cOUN7y ^ 
STATE OF GEORGIA ' v"tD IN THIS opffi 
MAY 0 ; 
INTERJ\A1 OPERATING PROCEDURE &?-&£-. 4 ^ , _ , 
7 
IN RE: DOMESTIC RELATIONS ACTION STANDING ORDER 
IMPLEMENTING ORDER 
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-1-1(b) and O.C.G.A. § 9-ll-65(e), the Court hereby orders 
thai the attached "Domestic Relations Action Standing Order" shali apply to al] domestic 
relations actions, as defined in O.C.G.A. § 19-1-1(a), upon filing. The Clerk of Court shall 
complete Hie standing order by msenmg the names of the parties and the case number, and shall 
file the order with the case. 
When domestic relations actions are filed requiring service by the sheriff or by 
publication, the Clerk shall attach copies of the filed standing order to the ongmal and service 
copies of the action and give or mail a copy' of the'filed standing order to the attorney or person 
filing the action. 
When domestic relations actions are filed with an acknowledgment of sendee, the Clerk 
shall attach a copy of the filed standing order to the original complaint and give or mail two 
copies of the filed standing order to the attorney or person filing the action, with instructions that 
he or she is responsible for serving the defendant with a copy of the order. • 
This Order shall apply to all domesiic relations act-ions filed on or after n^^j I —- , 
2007, and al] pending domestic relations actions within which a final judgment and decree of 
divorce has not yet been entered by the Court prior to ////4W / •— 2007. For actions 
pending prior to /11 /3 v/ / ^J- 2007, the requisite Cliild Support Worksheet and 
Schedules and Domestic Relations Financial Affidavit must be completed and filed by both 
parties prior to the next hearing on child support. 
This Internal Operating Procedure^ sirSfD supersede Internal Operating Procedure 06-02. 
/ ^ Kl/ 
SO ORDERED, this./ "~ day of / / ^ W / .2007. 
yi, AM /A ^/A\ P J J I / <V / /<M / fUi^UL/W' 
/ ieffr^l^L^agiey, ChjefjJudge / Davic^L. Dipidhsom JudgX 
\ 
7orsvtI / ij^oiinty Superioj' Court / ForsVth Cotaty Superior Count 
Bell-f)Drs)4h Judicial Circuit / Bell-^bns)^\Judic|al.Cu'CUitS 
/ 
/ 
maltreats, vilifies, molests, or harasses, or winch may, upon judicial determination, constitute 
threats, harassment, or stalking the adverse party or the child(ren) of the parties or any act which 
constitutes a violation of other civil or cnmma! laws of this state. 
NO REMOVAL OF ANY PROPERTY- Each party is hereby enjoined and restrained from 
selling, encumbering, trading, contracting to sell, or otherwise disposing of or removing from the 
jurisdiction of tins Court, without the permission of the Court, any of the property belonging to 
the parties except m the. ordinary course of business or except in an emergency which has been 
created by the other party to the action. 
5 . • 
MUST ATTEND SEMNAR FOR DIVORCING PARENTS- Parties to domestic relations 
actions involving minor children are required to attend a seminar for divorcing parents within 31 
days of service of the original Complaint upon the Defendant. Failure to complete the seminar in 
a timely manner may subject the non-complying party to contempt or other sanctions, may delay 
any temporary hearings or mediation sessions, and may delay the granting of a final decree of 
divorce. See www.adr9,com for more information. 
r 
0. 
MLTST FILE DOMESTIC RELATIONS FINANCIAL AFFIDAVIT- Parties are to complete 
and file a Domestic Relations Financial .Affidavit, as required by Uniform Superior Coun Rule 
24.2. That is, at the time of filing any action for temporary or permanent child support, alimony. 
,©qaaitaMe*di^^ or .alimony or attorneys fees, the 
filing party shall file with the Clerk of Court the affidavit specifying his or her financial 
circumstances in the form set forth m Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.2. . 
The Clerk of Court shall be authonzed to not accept the filing of any new action requiring the 
Domestic Relations Financial Affidavit if said affidavit is not completed and presented when the 
new7 action is sought to be filed, in cases not involving child support, in which a settlement 
agreement is filed with the complaint for divorce, Hie parties are relieved of the responsibility to 
file.the Domestic Relations Financial Affidavit and the Clerk of Court shall notwithstanding the 
absence of the Domestic Relations Financial Affidavit, file'the complaint and settlement 
agreement. 
In protective order actions filed under O.C.G.A. §19-13-1, et. seq.} the affidavit may.be filed-on 
or before the date of the hearing. 
The opposing party shall serve his or her affidavit at least five (5) days prior to the temporary 
hearing; at least five (5) days prior to court ordered mediation; or with his oi her answer QT tinny 
days-after service of the complaint, whichever first occurs, if no application for a temporary 
award is made and the parlies do not participate in mediation prior to trial. 
discretion, may consider tiie Plaintiffs proffered income evidence of Defendant's income as an 
admission by the Defendant. If the Plaintiff fails to indicate what he/she believes the Defendant:'; 
income to be, the, Conn may impute income to tiie Defendant at the prevailing federal minimum 
wage. 
9. 
FAILURE OF DEPENDANT TO FILE CHILD SUPPORT1 WORKSHEET AND 
SCHEDULES- The Cieri: of Cowrl will be directed to accepi the Defendant's Answer even if 
the Worksheet and Schedules are not"attached; however, the Defendant may be subject to the 
consequences as outlined above in paragraph 8. 
The Clerk of Court shall be required to mail notice to the Defendant relaxed to the Defendant's 
non-compliance with the Standing Order if any answer is accepted without: tiie required 
Worksheet and Schedules attached. 
10. 
WEBSITE ADDRESS FOE CHILD SUPPORT WORKSHEET AND SCHEDULES-
WTiere pro se parties are involved, the Clerk of Court shall inform said pro se persons as to the 
availability of internet access to the Georgia Child Support Commission's website with the 
guided electronic worksheet at all "Forsyth County public libraries and law libraries. The Georgia 
Child Support Commission's web address is: hftp://'www.georgiacourts.org/csc. 
M E M A T I O M ^ ^ CASES- Barnes.in cases 
yiwofea comested rasto&y are r e e v e d \o sfttad m^isaiovipivai to a&y & M I hearing. 
This Standing Order shall supersede previous versions and shall become effective; on 
/Sr ( L 
SO ORDERED, this / —day of / / i ^ xJ .  2007. 
1 
/ \ / X / / / , ,s 
Jeffi^W&>^acie)'; Clh^f|)udge j David L. Dic/ioinsroio Judge \ 
Forsyjh (26unr\; Supepoij Court / Forsyth CoiMy (Superior Coiirt\ 
Bell-Forsyth .indiaafStfcuit / BelLForsyth Judicial Drcmt j 
I 
I 
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ADDENDUM D 
W O O D CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins (4854) 
Lance D.Rich (10241) 
Bnnton M. Wilkins (10713) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
I N T H E FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR T H E STATE OF U T A H 
I N A N D FOR BOX E L D E R C O U N T Y 
MARCO A. DONJUAN, ) 
Petitioner, ] 
v. ] 
GABRIELLE McDERMOTT, \ 
Respondent. 
) RESPONDENT'S MEMORANDUM 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
) DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE 
) A CLAIM OR FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 094100254 
) Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Because Petitioner Marco A. Donjuan knew by July 9, 2009 that Respondent Gabrielle 
McDermott intended to give birth and place the child for adoption in Utah but did not stricdy 
comply with all of the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3) prior to execution of her 
consent to adoption on August 3, 2009, he is considered to have waived and surrendered all rights 
to the child under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-122(2). In particular, Mr. Donjuan did not file a sworn 
affidavit in the paternity proceedings prior to the adoptive placement as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-6-121(3)(b). His efforts to rectify this failure a week after the adoptive placement by 
filing an amended petition that he verified are insufficient. The court should reject Mr. Donjuan's 
attempt to substantially comply with the paternity requirements for unwed fathers by use of the 
relation-back doctrine because applying Utah R. Civ. P. 15 in that manner would undermine the 
m SEP 18 PMI2.-30 
5. On August 3, 2009, Ms. McDermott appeared before Judge Kate A. Toomey in die 
Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake City, Utah, and executed her consent to adoption. A 
redacted copy of Gabrielle McDermott7 s Consent to Adoption, omitting the names of the adoptive 
parents, is attached as Exhibit D. Therein, Ms. McDermot t represents that she is currendy single, 
and was not married at the time of conception to the birth father of the child or any other man. 
Ex. D at 4 J 17. 
6. At that hearing on August 3, 2009, Ms. McDermott5 s counsel informed the court 
that a paternity action had been filed and that notice of that action had been filed with Utah Vital 
Records, but that the putative fauier had not filed a sworn affidavit in the paternity proceeding. 
7. Counsel for the adoptive parents served notice of adoption proceedings on Mr. 
Donjuan. In that notice, Mr. Donjuan was informed of the failure to file the sworn affidavit with 
this Court. A copy of the notice is attached as Exhibit E. 
8. O n August 10, 2009, Mr. Donjuan signed the Amended Petition to Establish 
Paternity. 
9. On August 29, 2009, Ms. McDermott received the Summons and Amended Petition 
to Establish Paternity, copies of which are attached together as Exhibit F. Aldiough the Amended 
Petition is verified by Mr. Donjuan, it is not signed by his counsel. 
iii 
f 
An unwed father of a newborn child is required to take all of the following steps to preserve 
a legal interest in die child prior to execution of die mother's consent to adoption: 
(a) initiate[] proceedings in a district court of the state to establish paternity under 
Tide 78B, Chapter 15, Utah Uniform Parentage Act; 
(b)file[] with the court that is presiding over the paternity proceeding a sworn affidavit: 
(i) stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the child; 
(ii) setting forth his plans for the care of the child; and 
(Hi) agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of expenses incurred in 
connection "with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth; 
(c) consistent with Subsection (4), file[] notice of the commencement of paternity 
proceedings, described in Subsection (3)(a), with the state registrar of vital statistics 
within die Department of Health, in a confidential registry7 established by the 
department for that purpose; and 
(d) offered to pay and paid a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in 
connection with die mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in accordance with his 
financial ability, unless [he was excused for reasons set forth in the statute]. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-121(3) (emphasis added). 
Because Mr. Donjuan was informed on July 9, 2009 that Ms. McDermott had relocated to 
Utah, planned to give birth in Utah, and planned to place die child for adoption in Utah and 
pursuant to Utah law, see Ex. A and B, he was required to strictly comply with each of Subsection 
78B-6-121(3)'s requirements. He did not and has surrendered any interest in the child. As such, he 
lacks standing to pursue these paternity proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-121(3) and 
78B-6-122(2); O'Dea, 2009 UT 46, fflf 1, 46. 
II. MR. D O N J U A N LACKS STANDING BECAUSE H E FAILED TO STRICTLY 
COMPLY W I T H SUBSECTION 78B-6-121(3)(b). 
Even where an unwed fadier has timely filed a paternity petiuon and registered notice of 
such proceeding, he has waived his rights to the child if he did not strictly comply with Subsection 
78B-6-121(3)(b)'s requirement to file a sworn affidavit containing certain statements under oath to 
showT his full commitment to his parental responsibilities prior to execution of the mother's consent 
to adoption. In In re adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 2008 UT App 449, 199 P.3d 368, die Utah Court of 
Appeals recentiy held that an unwed father waived his rights to the child due to his failure to file a 
9 
compliance means "fully meeting each test imposed by the statute."); Lebrv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 
265 (1983) ("The legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and having 
the adoption proceeding completed expeditiously that underlie the entire statutory scheme also 
justify a trial judge's determination to require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the 
procedural requirements of the statute."). The importance of strict compliance is underscored by 
multiple references in the Adoption Act.2 Also, Utah courts have repeatedly held that strict, not 
substantial, compliance is required by unwed fathers to prevent an adoption. See, e.g., Sanche^ v. 
L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984) ("It is of no constitutional importance that [the 
unwed father] came close to complying widi the statute."); In re Adoption ofW, 904 P.2d 1113, 1121 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Requiring strict compliance with the adoption statutes is reasonable 
because of the nature of adoptions."). In other areas of law where strict compliance is required, 
Utah courts "have repeatedly denied recourse to parties that have even slighdy diverged from the 
exactness required by" the statute. See Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, % 12, 40 P.3d 632. 
Thus, because Mr. Donjuan did not file a sworn affidavit or any of the sworn statements 
required by Subsection 78B-6-121(3)(b) prior to execution of Ms. McDermott's consent, he did not 
precisely comply with this statute. And, Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) does not excuse his failure to do so. 
B. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) does not excuse Mr. Donjuan's failure to file a sworn 
affidavit prior to execution of Ms. McDermott's consent to adoption. 
Mr. Donjuan's apparent reliance upon Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) to attempt to correct his failure 
to file a sworn affidavit is fundamentally misplaced. While die rule may be used to have the filing of 
an amended "pleading" relate back to the date the original pleading was filed, it cannot be used to 
have the filing of an affidavit relate back to the filing of a pleading. The Court should reject Mr. 
2
 See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-102(6)(b, f) (unwed father's parental interest may be lost 
entirely by "his failure to stricdy comply with the available steps to substantiate" a relationship with 
the child and "the child may be adopted without his consent unless he stricdy complies with the 
provisions of this chapter . . . "); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-6-120(l)(f)(2) and 78B-6-122(2). 
4 
c 
parents . . . outweigh die interest of an unmarried biological fadier who does not timely grasp die 
opportunity to establish and demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance widi the 
requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-102(6)(c). 
The Utah Supreme Court long ago recognized die state's compelling interest in speedily 
identifying those with an interest in an adoption even before enactment of these provisions: 
The state has a strong interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume 
the parental role over such children, not just to assure immediate and continued 
physical care but also to facilitate early and uninterrupted bonding of a child to its 
parents. The state must tiierefore have legal means to ascertain within a very short time 
of birth whedier the biological parents (or either of diem) are going to assert dieir 
constitutional rights and fulfill their corresponding responsibilities, or whether 
adoptive parents must be substituted. 
Wells i> Children's Aid Soc'y of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court recendy reaffirmed die state's compelling interest In Thurnwald v. A.E., 
the court stated that "[t]he state . . . has compelling interests in promoting 'early and uninterrupted 
bonding between child and parents' and in facilitating final and irrevocable adoptions." 2007 UT 38, 
% 34, 163 P.3d 623, quoting Wells, 681 P.2d at 206. The court decided that an unwed fadier must 
stricdy comply with the statutory requirements no later dian one business day after die child's birdi 
unless die modier waits longer to sign her consent. Id. at [^ 46. 
If the Court were to allow Mr. Donjuan's untimely verification of the amended paternity 
petition to satisfy the sworn affidavit requirement tiirough the relation-back doctrine, die purposes of 
die adoption statute would be frustrated. N o one would be able to look at what die unwed father has 
timely filed and rely on the content tiiereof, because he would be able to fix any deficiencies after die 
critical time when the adoptive placement occurs. 
Courts, and mothers of children born out of wedlock, need to know prompdy diat an unwed 
father can be bound to assume custody of the child, pay child support, and contribute to expenses of 
the pregnancy and birth. The sworn affidavit requirement makes die unwed fadier accept and 
acknowledge personal responsibility not only in writing, but under oath, so he cannot later retract 
6 
requisite statements. Baby Boy Doe, 2008 UT App 449, ^]]| 3-5. That court's willingness to "assume, 
without deciding" that Rule 15 could apply and to dismiss the appeal on a simpler issue, does not create 
precedent to show that the relation-back doctrine apphes in this context Id. at \ 3 (emphasis added). 
Additionally, as in Baby Boy Doe, neither of the petitions submitted by Mr. Donjuan is 
acceptable. The original petition is insufficient because if failed to contain die necessary sworn 
statements required by Subsection 78-6-121 (3) (b). See Ex. C. The amended petition is insufficient 
because it was not signed by Mr. Donjuan's attorney. See Ex. F; Utah R. Civ. P. 11(a)(1) ("Ever)' 
pleading, written motion, and other paper shal/be signed bay at least one attorney of record . . . ."). 
As explained in Baby Boy Doe, die court should not read these document togedier to comply with all 
of the requirements, when neither does so independendy, 2007 UT App 449, Yd 3-5. 
Moreover, in many respects Mr. Donjuan showed less initial compliance with the sworn 
affidavit requirement than did the unwed father in Baby Boy Doe. Whereas die father in Baby Boy Doe 
filed a timely verifiedpetition, Mr. Donjuan's paternity7 petition was unverified. See Ex. C. Also, 
whereas the father in Baby Boy Doe filed an amended petition in the effort to supplement his original 
petition the next day, Mr. Donjuan's amended petition was not filed until a week after his time for 
compliance had expired. Indeed, Ms. McDermott, through counsel, checked to see if he had filed a 
sworn affidavit. Discovering its absence, she and die adoptive parents relied upon this fact in 
proceeding with the execution of her consent to adoption. Thus, the reliance upon Mr. Donjuan's 
insufficient paternity petition was much greater than what occurred in Baby Boy Doe. 
Furthermore, in the context of medical malpractice suits (which arguably require less finality 
that adoption cases), courts have repeatedly denied attempts to use Rule 15(c) to relate back to an 
original petition to correct a failure to file a sworn affidavit. See Scarsella v. Pollak, 607 N.W.2d 711, 
713 (Mich. 2000); Thigpen v. Ngo, 558 S.E.2d 162, 166 (N.C. 2002); Fales v. Jacobs, 588 S.E.2d 294, 295 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003). In each of these cases, the courts rejected a plaintiffs argument that 
has only partially completed the process to protect his economic interest in the property." Similarly, 
an unwed birth father has only inchoate parental rights to a child until he has strictly comphed with all 
requirements to establish paternity. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-102(5)(e). Thus, just as the time 
limit for pursuing a mechanic hen holder's inchoate right forms a substantive part of the holder's 
economic interest in the property precluding application of the relation-back doctrine, the time limit 
imposed by the Adoption Act formed a substantive part of Mr. Donjuan's interest in the child, and his 
failure to meet that time limit means that he has no claim to which his amended petition could relate 
back. Once Mr. Donjuan's deadline for complying with Subsection 78B-6-121(3)'s requirements 
passed on August 3, 2009, he had waived all rights to the child and his paternity petition became null 
and void. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss this proceeding. 
D A T E D this 17th day of September, 2009. 
W O O D CRAPO LLC 
Larry S. Jenkins 
Lance D. Rich 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
4
 Black's Law Dictionary defines "inchoate" as follows: "Partially completed or imperfectly 
formed; just begun." Black's Law Dictionary 765 (Deluxe 7th ed. 1999). Also, cases from other 
states follow a similar analysis when analyzing requirements that affidavits accompany an original 
complaint. For example, in Washoe Medical Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 790 (Nev. 2006), 
the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action but did not file the medical expert affidavit required 
by state law before the statute of limitations ran. Id. at 791. The Nevada Supreme Court held that 
"a [medical malpractice] complaint filed without a supporting medical expert affidavit is void ab 
initio and must be dismissed." Id. at 792. Also, "(b]ecause a void complaint does not legally exist, it 
cannot be amended." Id. 
10 
EXHIBIT A 
AFFIDAVIT OF RELINQUISHMENT AND CONSENT TO ADOPTION 
This document must be signed in front of a notary public. 
L Marco Arturo Donjuan, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say that 1 
believe 1 am the biological father of a child to be born to Gabrielle McDermott on or about 
July 31, 2009. 
1 do hereby relinquish and reiease forever any and all parental rights 1 may have with 
respect to the above-referenced child, whatever those rights may be, and consent to the legal 
adoption of said child. 
1 am emotionally stable at this time to make this decision of release. 
1 am not on any medication or drug that could alter my ability to decide. 
I am not a member of a Native American tribe or qualified for membership in a 
Native American tribe, nor am 1 an Alaskan Native or member of an Alaskan Regional 
Corporation or Alaskan Village. 
1 am aware and understand fully my action of releasing my parental rights with 
regard to child. 
1 now waive any notice of any legal proceedings which may be held in the courts of 
the State of Utah, or elsewhere for the purpose of adoption of said child. 
1 have read the foregoing statement and understand fully the terms and conditions. I 
consent to the statements within. Action taken herein is of my own free will and choice and 
is executed voluntarily without force, duress, or promise. 
1 realize that this relinquishment is legally and irrevocably binding under the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
Signature Date 
Marco Arturo Donjuan 
STATE OF GEORGIA ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF ) 
On this day of . 2009, personally appeared before me, a notary 
public, the above named individual who swore or affirmed to me that his signature upon this 
instrument was voluntary and that he was under no undue influence or duress. 
"Notary Public 
S:\WPDATA\LSJO\RELINQUlSHMENT AND CONSENT.MARCO DONJUAN.wpd 
Amy Sorensen 
From: UPS Quantum View [auto-notify@ups.com] 
Sent: Thursday, July 09, 2009 2:10 PM 
To: Amy Sorensen 
Subject: UPS Delivery Notification, Tracking Number 1ZV022430291393726 
***Do not reply to this e-mail. UPS and Wood Crapo LLC will not receive your reply. 
At the request of Wood Crapo LLC, this notice alerts you that the shipment listed 
below has been delivered. 
important Delivery Information 
Delivery Date / Time: 09-July-2009 / 3:45 PM 
Driver Release Location: FRONT DOOR 
Shipment Detail 
Ship To: 
Macro Donjuan 
6245 GLEN BROOKE DR 
CUMMING 
GA 
30040 
US 
UPS Service: 2ND DAY AIR 
Shipment Type: Letter 
Tracking Number: 1ZV022430291393726 
Reference Number 1: Gabby McDermott 
2ll2ll2P8Rzr_o 
Discover more about UPS: 
Visitwww.ups.com 
Sign Up For Additional E-Mail From UPS 
Read Compass Oniine 
9/16/2009 
EXHIBIT C 
3. At the time of conception, the parries were unmarried. Petitioner believes that he is 
the child's biological father. 
4. Petitioner has paid several expenses incuued in connection with the Respondents 
pregnancy and has sent money orders 10 Respondent for financial support. 
CUSTODY AND PAUENT TIME 
5. Petitioner is a fit and proper person and it is in the best interests of the minor child 
that Petitioner be awarded sole care, custody and control of the minor child, 
6. Respondent should be awarded reasonable parent-time with the minor child to 
include the Minimum Schedule for Visitation contained in Utah Code §30-3-35, and 
such additional visitation as mutually agreed to by the parties, and those rights of the 
non-custodial parent listed as Advisory Guidelines in Utah Code §30-3-33. 
7. Petitioner requests the Court issue anDecree and Order Establishing Paternity in this 
matter. 
CHILD SUPPORT 
8. The Court should calculate child support per the uniform guideline requirements. 
CHILD CARE 
9. Each party should pay one-half (14) of the work-related or educational-related child 
care incurred on behalf of the minor child 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND PAYMENTS OF MEDICAL EXPENSES 
10. The parties shoul d be ordered to maintain health and accident insurance on the minor 
child, so long as it is available through their places of employment at a reasonable 
Petibon to Establish Pftlermiy - Page 2 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
15, Respondent should be ordered to pay attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter. 
MISCELLANEOUS 
16. Both parties should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other party any 
documents necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree and Order Establishing 
Paternity in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner demands judgment as follows: 
1. For a Judgment and Decree and Order Establishing Paternity, the same to become final 
upon the signing and filing thereof. 
2. For relief granted in accordance with Petitioner's petition. 
3. For any other relief the court determines to be fair and equitable. 
DATED this <L? day of July, 2009. 
DArzVTboRius 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Petition to Establish Paternity - Page 4 
WOOD CRAP O u r 
Larry S. Jenkins (4854) 
Richard J. Armstrong (7461) 
Lance D. Rich (10241) 
BnntonM. Wilkins (10713) 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 366-6060 
Attorneys for Birth Mother 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
) 
) GABRIELLE McDERMOTT'S 
) CONSENT TO ADOPTION 
) 
) Civil No. 092900321 
) Judge 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
GABRIELLE McDERMOTT deposes and states under oath., the following: 
1. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-124,1 hereby consent to the adoption 
of Baby M; who is a female child bom to me at on July 31. 2009, at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, to the petitioners in this matter. . I yield all of my rights to care. 
custody, and control of Baby M to petitioners. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 0 3 2009 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
In the matter of the 
adoption of Baby M> 
9. I am not a member of an Indian Tribe, an Alaska Native, or a member of 
an Alaska Regional Corporation. To the best of my knowledge, the child's father is not a member 
of an Indian Tribe, an Alaska Native or member of an Alaska Regional Corporation, nor is this 
child eligible for membership in an Indian Tribe or an Alaska Regional Corporation. 
10. I acknowledge my understanding that if the court accepts my Consent to 
Adoption, thai this Consent to Adoption is irrevocable, that I will have no further responsibilities 
or nghts in relation to Baby M, and that I cannot change my mind regarding my decision to place 
Baby M for adoption with 
11. I intend that this Consent to Adoption be irrevocable as to 
.., the petitioners in this proceeding. I am not, however consenting to the adoption of Baby M 
by any other person or persons. If . are unable to complete the adoption of 
Baby M for any reason, and the adoption petition is dismissed, I desire, and I believe that it is in 
Baby M's best interests that Baby M be returned to my custody and control. 
12. I waive any rights that I may have to notice of these proceedings or any 
further proceedings involving the adoption of Baby M. 
13. I fully understand by consenting to the adoption, when the adoption is 
completed I will be relieved of all parental duties, obligations and responsibilities and shall have 
no further nghts regarding care, custody, visitation, or adoption of Baby M. At the completion of 
3 
ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL OF CONSENT 
This Consent to Adoption was EXECUTED IN OPEN COURT by GABPvIELLE 
McDERMOTT this 3rd day of August, 2009, at °\ '• ffD a.m. The Court certifies that, to 
the best of its information and belief, GABRIELLE McDERMOTT has read and understands this 
instrument and has signed it freely and voluntarily. 
Kate kOm^^/^V \^~l 
J=S-
T ^ V - ^ 
PrAdv/17086-010 
5 
David M. McConkie (2154) 
dmcconkie@kmclaw. com 
David J. Hardy (5963) 
dhardy@kmclaw.com 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
60 East South Temple, #1800 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801)328-3600 
By_ 
FILED DISTRICT C0UR 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 0 6 2009 
SALT LAKE COuNl -. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Adoption of 
BABY M, 
a minor child 
NOTICE OF ADOPTION 
PROCEEDING 
Civil No. 092900321 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: Marco Arturo Donjuan 
6245 Glenbrooke Drive 
dimming, GA 30028 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a Petition for Adoption has been filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County. Utah, in the above-entitled matter. The proceeding is 
regarding a female child born on July 31, 2009 to Gabrielle McDermott. 
4852-3859-046S 
PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT YOU HAVE THIRTY (30) DAYS FROM THE 
DATE YOU RECEIVE THIS NOTICE TO FILE A MOTION TO INTERVENE IN 
THESE ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS. 
A Motion to Intervene must be filed with the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, with a copy mailed to David 
J. Hardy and David M. McConkie at Kirton & McConkie, 1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East 
South Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004, A Motion to Intervene must set forth 
the specific relief sought and be accompanied by a Memorandum specifying the factual and 
legal grounds upon which the Motion is based. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-110(6)(a). 
If you desire to have a copy of the Petition filed in this matter, please contact David J. 
Hardy and David M. McConkie at Kirton & McConkie, 1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South 
Temple Street Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004. Telephone: 801-328-3600. 
If you fail to file a Motion to Intervene as outlined herein within thirty (30) days 
after receiving this notice, the Court may, without further notice to you, enter an Order 
stating: (1) that you have waived any right you may have had to further notice in 
connection with the adoption of the child, (2) that you have forfeited all rights you may 
have had in relation to the child, and (3) that you are barred from thereafter bringing or 
maintaining any action to assert any rights to or interest in the minor childc 
DATED this t> day of August, 2009. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
David }?. 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
4852-3859-0468.1 
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SENDER: VOMPtBTBTHIS SECTION COMPLETE THIS SECTION ON DELIVERY 
Complete items 1,2, and 3. Also complete 
Item 4 If Restricted Delivery is desired. 
Print your name and address on the reverse 
so that we can return the card to you. 
Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece, 
or ctfthe front if space permits. 
1. Article Addressed to 
Marco A. Donjuan 
6245 Glenbrooke Drive 
Cumming, GA 30028 
/X6(9 j / )b D Agent • Addressee 
by (Printed Name) 
- L £ > U 
C. Date of Delivery 
D is delivery address different^  
If YES, enter delivery c 
3.
 vServiceType 
Mai! D I 
D Registered ^JS^Retum Receipt for Merchandise 
• insured Mali • C.O.D. 
4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee) DYes 
2. Article Number *^&&Q 
(Transfer from service label) 
PS Form 3 8 1 1 , February 2004 Domestic Return Receipt 10259&O2-M-1540 
DALE JVL DORIUS - #0905 
JENNIFER D. REYES - £9004 
DORIDS 6. RE\ ES 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
P 0 bo 89-
2Ll Souti Main 
Bngnam Cir\ I I £>-i3(2 
( 4 ^ ) " 2 - ^219 Phone 
( 4 3 N "2^5210 Ta> 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNT\ . ST ATE OF U1AJH 
IvlARCO A DONTJUA)\ 
Petitioner SUMMONS 
vs 
G^BRIELLE McDERMOTT 
Respondent 
Civil No 0C^IOC2^4 
Jucme Ben ri Hadfield 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT GABREELLEMcDERMOTT 
\ ou a r ehe r^ summoned and required to file an Answc in writing to the attached Amended 
Petition to Establish Paternit\ with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at ^5 Nortn Mam Street 
Bngnam Cm UT 8^302 and to serve upon or mail to Petitioner s attorney at P 0 Box 89S 
Bngham Cm, Utah S4302 a cop) of said answei, within twent\ CO) davs aftei service of ihu. 
Summons upon vou 
If vou fail to do so Judgment bv Default will be taker against vou for the relief demanded in 
said Amended Petition to Establish Pateinitv wmch has been filed with the Clerl of the Coun and 
a cop\ of wrncn is neretc annexed and served upon you 
DATED tms t 2 ^ h a \ of Auuust 200c' 
rNNIFER/D REgES 
'Attorne^jo*' Petitions 
IX)i i^ rv) \ MwDriiMuT 
3. A: the time of conception, the panies. were unmarried. Petitioner believer; thai he is 
the child's biological father. 
4. Petitioner has offeree! to par and did pay -c\ fail' and reasonable amouni of expenses 
incurred with Respondent's pregnane} and is willing and ready to pay for expensess incurred ui 
connection with the. child's birth. 
CUSTODY AND PARENT TIME 
5. Petitioner is a fit and proper person and Petitioner is fully able and willing to nave 
rub custody of the child. 
6. Respondent should be awarded reasonableparem-time with the minor child to include 
ihe Minimum Scnedule for Visitation contained in Utah Code §30-3-35. and such additional 
visitation as mutually agreed to by the parries, and those rights of the non-custodial parent listed as 
Advisory Guidelines in litan Code §30-3-33. 
7. Petitioner requests the Court issue an Decree and Order Establishing Paternity m this 
matter. 
PLAN FOR CARE OF CHILD 
8. Petitioner hereby sets forth his plans for care of the child 
a. Petitioner is currently employed and is capable of financially providing for 
both himself and the minor child. 
b. Petitioners work schedule is extremely fiexiDJe to the extent that the needs 
of the child would always come first. 
c. Petitioner has a ciose-kmt family and family support. Petitioners mother, the 
Amended Psiiiion 10 EsuibiiSii Palermo - Pu<rj 2 
holidays., importam ceremonies, and other significant events in tne life of the chiici or in trie life of 
either parem which may inadvertently conflict with the parentinc1 lime schedule: 
g. Tne non-cusiodia! parent should pici: up the child at tne time specified and 
return the child at the time specified, and the child's regular school hours snould not be interrupted: 
h. The custodial parent should have the cmld read}' for parenting time at tne time 
the chile is to oe picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or should make reasonable 
alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time the child is returned: 
i. Reasonable alterations in the parenting time schedule should be made to 
accommodate the work schedule of both parents: 
j . The non-custodial parent should have access direct]}- to all school reports, and 
medical records, and shall be notified immediately by tne custodial parent in the event of a medical 
emergency: and 
k. Each parent should provide the other with his or her current address and 
telephone number withm 24 hours of any change. 
CHILI) SUPPORT 
10. Petitioner agrees to a court order of child support and the payment of expenses 
incurred in connection with the mothers pregnane}- and the child's birth. 
CHILD CAR E 
11. Each party should pay one-half (lA) of the work-related or educational-related cniid 
care incurred on behalf of the minor child. 
Amended Petition lo Establish Piiierniiy - Paus 4 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
p.esponaen* snouic oe oraered to pav attomr; fee: anc cosir mcurrso n tin: matte: 
fflSCXIxLANEODS 
j£ Botl parties snoiiid De ordered tc execute aric oebve: ic the otner party any 
aocmnect;; necessary to effectuate tns terms of the Dscrec anc Order Bsiablishing Paternity in this 
matte: 
IP r.r,KE?01'E. Pennons: demand: judgment nr follows 
For a Judgment and Decree and OraerEsi^bnshmoPateniitj the same to oxomc final 
upon tne signing and fihng thereof 
Per relief grantee in accordance witn Pctmoner : pennon 
For any otner relief the conn determines to be 12.11 ano samtabic 
31 ATS OF /JtfSfSS/fi^'', 
*.ss 
30UNFY Or /J&&SOAJ ) 
MARCO A DONTJAK, being firs: dui}r swom.and under oatx_ deposes and says that ne is 
the Petitioner in tne above-entitled action: that he has read the foregoing Amended Petition to 
EsrabiiiLPaterinry. and understands the contents thereof and the same is true of his o-wn knowledge, 
iniorrnanon ann Dsiiei 
IDATED tms /0 ' n aay of Ausust. 2009. 
MARCO A DDWZ&s 
Petitioner ^ 
tms /u as I SUBSCRIBED -AND SWOFJ\T to refore ms this /J oav of AtnrusL 2009. 
Motarv Public 
AJr^nosi rcu"uoi> to rsiat>usL PaiKiiiry - rape t * prvrir^ ""•' ^^^TVy^ - - ^-r,_. 
U; 
